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 
Abstract—Social IoT environment comprises not just smart 
devices, but also the humans to interact with these IoT devices. The 
benefits of such system are overshadowed by the issues of cyber 
security. A new approach is required for us to understand the 
security implication under such dynamic environment, while 
taking both the social and technical aspects into consideration. 
This paper proposed a 3D security modelling platform that can 
capture and model security requirements in Social IoT 
environment. The modelling process is graphical notation based, 
working as a security extension to Business Process Model and 
Notation. Still, it utilises the latest 3D game technology thus the 
security extensions are generated through the third dimension. In 
this way, the introduction of security extensions will not increase 
the complexity of the original SIoT scenario, while keeping all the 
key information in the same platform. Together with the security 
ontology we have proposed, these comprehensive security 
notations created a unique platform that aiming at addressing the 
ever complicated security issues in SIoT envorinment.   
 
Index Terms—Business process, game technology, notation, 
security modelling, social IoT.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ITH recent advances in technology, Internet of Things 
(IoT) will play an important role in our daily lives. 
Billions of small devices with the capability of computing and 
communications not just enable a new way of interactions 
between humans and smart things, but also change our 
behaviors in the society, for example through the social 
networks. These ubiquitous IoT devices deeply embedded into 
our lives and eventually form part of a Social IoT (SIoT) 
environment [1]. 
Like any existing IT systems, a paramount question needs to 
be answered by the SIoT is the security issue [2]. The 
ubiquitous nature of IoT means it is not just the digital contents 
on these devices will be facing the threat. Even humans’ 
physical safety could be in danger due to the blurred boundary 
between the digital and physical worlds. The changing social 
relationship between humans and things represent the main 
difference, with the security implication is getting even more 
complicated. In such environment, technology solution alone 
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will not be able to address all the security concerns. The social 
aspect of the issue must be taken into account as well [3]. 
Therefore, the socio-technical challenges in terms of security 
should be addressed properly before the real implementation of 
SIoT. 
Among all the security issues, the very first one is always to 
identify and model the security requirements. In a dynamic 
environment like SIoT, devices may join and leave the network 
without the notice of the user. The lack of central point brought 
the question of where the security policy should be defined and 
how can they be enforced. In this paper, we investigate a novel 
approach to create a security requirement modelling platform 
that could help to effectively capture and model the security 
requirements in the SIoT environment. We build the platform 
based on Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN), which 
is comprehensive enough to represent both the humans and 
things as services in the same platform, and extend it with 
security requirements being captured in the third dimension. In 
this way, the security requirements are managed separately 
without increasing the complexity of the original SIoT 
scenarios. 
With a pre-defined security ontology [4], we created a set of 
security notations that can serve as an extension to the existing 
BPMN library. Together, they can model a SIoT scenario and 
the security requirements in a two steps approach. The notations 
we created have taken the Moody's “Physics of Notations” [5] 
into account and they are the first security notations to satisfy 
most of the design principles. 
The rest of paper is organised as the follows. Section II 
introduces the background of using BPMN to model SIoT 
scenario and the key concepts of the security ontology we use. 
The current modelling approaches and benefit of using third 
dimension are discussed in Section III. In Section IV, we 
address the design of our solution including the construct 
framework and notation visualisation. Section V then details the 
development process of our platform. In Section VI, we provide 
a brief overview of the implemented platform, including a run 
through of how security notation is added to an existing SIoT 
diagram. The evaluation of the proposed security notations then 
provided in Section VII. Section VIII analyse some existing 
BPMN security extensions identifying the notational issues 
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within each one. Finally the paper concluded with future work 
in Section IX. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Use BPMN for SIoT Scenario Modelling 
BPMN can be used to graphically represent business 
processes and their component relationships in a common 
standard between organisations [6, 7]. Apart from automatic 
service tasks that can be used to represent smart things, BPMN 
also provides the necessary social aspects such as the modelling 
of human tasks to demonstrate human activities. It allows 
interactions between humans and things to be captured in a 
single diagram. The Aniketo Project [8] has successfully 
utilised the BPMN platform to model a service-oriented 
environment incorporating both automatic services and manual 
user tasks. In our previous work [9], we also demonstrated the 
possibility to use BPMN diagrams to represent the IoT 
environment. In general, if we see each IoT device as a service 
provider, they can be represented in the BPMN diagrams as a 
service task. The whole scenario can then be described as a set 
of linked tasks, which must be executed in a specific order, 
collectively resulting in an objective or policy goal being 
achieved. These tasks can even be conducted across one or 
multiple organisations [10].  
BPMN fulfils the requirement of visually representing 
process and is now the industry standard for business process 
modelling [11]. Nevertheless, even though security directly 
affects the functionality of these processes, BPMN has no 
support for specifying cyber security requirements [12, 13]. As 
it will be explained in Section VIII, current BPMN security 
extensions have made attempts, but they are being constructed 
unsystematically, without any empirical evidence to support 
their choice of concepts [14] or notational design. 
B. Cyber Security Ontology 
As a prerequisite, an ontology of cyber security requirements 
within the SIoT environment should be created first [5]. This 
allows ontological analysis to be conducted both throughout 
and after the creation of any BPMN security extension. 
Ontological analysis is a systematic process which prevents the 
issues such as construct deficit and ensures all necessary 
concepts are included. The process involves the comparison of 
a modelling language and an ontology to establish a one-to-one 
mapping between the two; either through interpretation 
mapping or representation mapping [5]. The ontology acts as a 
concept requirement list for the extension with ontological 
analysis determining whether or not all requirements are met. 
For the cyber security domain such an ontology already 
exists. In our previous work, we presented an ontology of cyber 
security requirements that aims to act as a foundation for the 
creation of a comprehensive BPMN security extension [4]. 
Stressing that current extensions have been heavily construct 
deficit and thereby fail to adequately provide a suitable tool for 
representing security requirements, we proposed a total of 79 
cyber security requirements that should be modellable in 
BPMN before an extension can be deemed comprehensive. 
These are structured into six areas with a hierarchy depth of 
four. The six areas being: access control, privacy, availability, 
integrity, accountability, attack/harm detection and prevention 
and availability. Full details of the ontology will not be 
discussed here as they can be found in paper [4]. 
With an ontology created, the next steps are to design and 
implement our solution. As mentioned, there are flaws with 
existing security extensions which are further elaborated upon 
in Section VIII. Throughout this paper we explore the 
hypothesis that a third dimension could provide the potential 
solution to these issues. By third dimension, we mean utilising 
3D game technology to turn the conventional 2D-based BPMN 
diagrams into a 3D environment, with the extra dimension 
being used to represent security information visually. It 
potentially will help the users to understand and manage 
information more efficiently, especially in a complex scenario 
as explained later in the Section III.B. We propose a novel 
solution that aims to be comprehensive to the ontology created 
by us and satisfy Moody's “Physics of Notations” [5], which 
defines the principles a notational modelling language should 
stick with. We aim to use this ontology as a basis for our 
solution of the platform, ensuring that we are not only 
overcoming the notational issues but also providing the first 
truly comprehensive tool for modelling cyber security 
requirements within SIoT. 
III. MODELLING APPROACHES 
A. Conventional Extension 
Although there are many tools available for modelling 
(Visio, UML Designer, Modelio etc.), they are all very similar 
in functionality and user interaction. Take Microsoft’s Visio as 
an example [15], see Fig. 1. The general user interface (UI) 
tends to include some form of workspace in the center of the 
screen. Typically on the left side of the UI, there will be a 
toolbar which includes the languages constructs. These are 
usually presented as their diagrammatic visual representation 
along with accompanying textual names. These constructs can 
then be added to the diagram through either drag-and-drop or 
by first selecting a construct then clicking somewhere within 
the workspace to place it there; this functionality being 
dependent on the software.  
 
Fig. 1. Microsoft Visio [15] 
There are some tools such as Activiti [16], which also feature 
detail bars along the bottom of the screen. These usually offer a 
more practical and familiar method of changing construct text 
or unique identifiers through text input boxes. 
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTATIONAL SOCIAL SYSTEMS 
 
3 
When developing a security extension, most authors will 
typically expand on an already existing tool such as Visio. Most 
tools usually include some functionality for the creation or 
inclusion of custom notation. SecBPMN2 for example [11], 
utilises Visio’s Stencil functionality. This allows users to create 
a custom toolbar of their favourite symbols for use later on. It 
also allows for the saving of custom symbols as seen in Fig. 2. 
 
Fig. 2. SecBPMN2 - Visio Stencil 
As most security extensions are represented in a similar 
manner to that of BPMN, there has been little progress in terms 
of new modelling approaches. Most authors merely present a 
set of concepts and accompanying symbols, regardless of the 
fact that by adding more constructs they have increased the 
languages complexity and potentially nullified any complexity 
management the language had in place. 
B. 2D versus 3D 
To address the issue of complexity management, we propose 
representing cyber security requirements across the third 
dimension.  
Research into 3D visualisations versus 2D visualisations has 
already provided empirical evidence supporting the use of 3D 
from both an efficient and user preference point of view [17]. 
The use of 3D in BPMN has also been investigated. The 
application created by Brown et al. [18] however does not 
feature any information across a third axis and merely provides 
a way of traversing or manipulating a 2D diagram. The 
advantage of our approach is that original SIoT scenario can 
remain relatively unaltered, being represented without change 
across two axes as seen in the left of Fig. 3. 
 
Fig. 3. 2D and 3D BPMN diagram 
Cyber security requirements can then be represented across 
the x, y, and z axes, as seen in the right of Fig. 3. This way, cyber 
security requirements are being displayed at a similar 
abstraction level as BPMN whilst still maintaining a 
comprehensible diagram. The application of 3D however 
provides its own issues such as interactivity and rotation 
techniques [19]. While there is no objective to solve the 
problem in this study, it is worth noting what current or new 
means of interaction will be needed. 
In another paper, we tested the feasibility of this hypothesis 
with user experimentation [20]. Participants were shown a 
simple BPMN diagram with several coloured circles linking to 
BPMN-task elements. Participants were then given a set 
amount of time in which they had to identify what colours were 
linked to each task, noting their results through a paper based 
questionnaire. The BPMN-task elements were assigned a 
number opposed to a business process, just as security was 
represented through coloured circles and not explicit notation. 
The intention being to represent current cyber security 
extensions in an abstract complexity-focused manner and not 
cause confusion or interference by including unnecessary 
business or security details.  
From these experiments, we found that for BPMN diagrams 
with a relatively low number of security notation (six 
constructs), 3D provided no advantage in terms of read speed 
and accuracy. With most users preferring the 2D approach over 
3D. However, when the complexity of the diagrams was 
increased (36 security constructs), 3D provided a substantial 
improvement in read speed and accuracy compared to 2D. More 
specifically, participants were able to read over 20% more of 
the 3D diagram with over twice the accuracy compared to 2D 
in the same amount of time.  
IV. DESIGNING A 3D BPMN SECURITY EXTENSION 
Given the encouraging results gained from experimentation, 
the application of 3D to BPMN holds a lot of potential for 
representing cyber security requirements. Before detailing the 
visualisation of the language however, there must first be a 
notation to extend with.  
A. Notation – Visual Vocabulary 
By using parts of the “Physics of Notations” [5], we were 
able to create a graphical framework that can be used to create 
security constructs for every concept within our ontology [4]. 
Perceptual Discriminability: When extending an existing 
language with a new domain, perceptual discriminability has 
two sides. The notation not only requires discriminability 
amongst its own constructs, but also against that of the extended 
language – i.e. all notations representing IoT scenario are 
clearly distinguishable from security notations. 
By representing security across the third dimension, BPMN 
and security notations will always be distinguishable first and 
foremost by whether or not they are across the x/z axes or the 
x/y/z axes. 
 Secondly, if a consistent shape is to be used for all constructs 
this means any distinguishing features must be encompassed 
within such a shape. A search on Google Images using the 
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keyword “security” 1  returned two most popular icons 
associated to security that we considered to use as outer shape 
in our design: padlock and shield.  
 
Fig. 4. Design space shape comparison 
If one refers to Fig. 4 it shows that a padlock shape takes up 
roughly 40 squares. However, the inner design space only 
allows for 20 squares (in green), just 50% of the space the 
construct occupies. By comparison, the shield takes up 39 
squares and allows for 23 full design spaces, i.e. 59% of the 
construct space. Therefore, in order to accommodate more 
discriminable features, we opted for a shield as the outer shape 
for our framework. 
Semantic Transparency: The semantic transparency of the 
symbols will be achieved primarily through the creation of a 
unique icon. As the outer shape will be consistent (Fig. 5a), 
without anything inside the shield there is no way to distinguish 
the constructs from each other. Therefore, each construct will 
include an icon specific to the concept it represents (Fig. 5d). 
Using an icon design approach for symbols has been proven to 
increase usability, recognition and familiarity [21]. Inevitably 
every symbol will require some learning. However, using this 
approach will improve the semantic immediacy of the 
constructs given icons natural goal of being a graphical 
mnemonic to their concept. 
Visual Expressiveness: There are eight visual variables can 
be used to construct a notation, these being: horizontal position, 
vertical position, shape, brightness, size, orientation, colour  
and texture [5]. We have already discussed how we have 
utilised shape, both as the outer shell of each construct and for 
the icons themselves.  
We also utilised brightness within our notation as a way of 
inferring what hierarchy depth the symbol is at. The brighter the 
construct the higher the level, see Fig. 5e. However, as 
brightness is only a secondary notation, this hierarchy is 
reinforced with a more robust variable: shape. Viewing of Fig. 
5b (and Fig. 5e) will show how we slightly changed the peaks 
of each shield to reiterate this hierarchy. We also used size to 
show this distinction. The higher the concept level the larger the 
construct. However, given that small symbols are difficult to 
read the size difference is relatively small. We deemed it more 
practical to keep the symbols at a readable size rather than 
utilise this variable to its full potential.  
As for colour, this was used as a way of separating the six 
key areas as specified in our ontology, see Fig. 5f.   Red = access control  Orange = privacy 
 
1
 Google Images, “Search Term: security,” 2018, <goo.gl/Es7JcP> 
(accessed 30/01/2018) 
 
Fig. 5. Notation Construct Framework 
 Green = integrity  Turquoise = accountability  Blue = attack/harm detection and prevention  Purple = availability 
Again, colour is only a secondary notation so this distinction 
is also reiterated elsewhere. In the next section we will discuss 
more about this. 
Concentrating on just the notation design itself, the final 
variable used is orientation. As discussed earlier, security is 
always distinguishable by the fact it is perpendicular to the IoT 
diagram at a different orientation. 
Dual Coding: Finally, dual coding. Given that this principle 
states that constructs should be accompanied by supporting text 
we added the name of each construct within the symbol. If you 
refer to Fig. 5c, you will see that our framework includes the 
concept name at the top of each shield. 
An example of a full hierarchy of symbols can be seen in Fig. 
6 (size is not demonstrated within this figure). This figure 
demonstrates the constructs: access control >  authentication >  
personnel authentication >  biometric.  
 
Fig. 6. Symbol examples 
From this you can see how brightness is used to determine 
the individual hierarchy level, along with the peak count at the 
top of each shield. It also acts as a good example of how simply 
following the “Physics of Notations” beforehand can drastically 
improve principles such as perceptual discriminability and 
semantic transparency. We do not claim to be expert icon 
designers. Nevertheless, by using other variables such as shape, 
colour, brightness and dual coding. The level of distinction 
amongst the symbols is a lot higher than the majority of the 
previously assessed extensions. 
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B. Notation – Visual Grammar 
Along with visual vocabulary (graphical symbols) a notation 
also requires visual grammar (compositional rules) [5]. For the 
proposed solution we build on from the 3D examples in our 
experiment [20]. That being, each IoT element will have its own 
unique holder capable of specifying any security requirements. 
However, representing 79 concepts at once on a single BPMN 
element will almost certainly cause cognitive overload and 
incur several complexity issues. Nevertheless, the incorporation 
of current BPMN functionality modularization [22], alongside 
3D will allow for a more manageable and therefore 
comprehensible diagram.  
 
Fig. 7. Notation - Visual Grammar 
For our solution we plan to display six concepts at the highest 
level on each IoT element (Fig. 7a), respective to the six key 
concepts identified by us [4]. These symbols will then act as 
individual buttons to modularise their sub-concepts. Once a 
symbol is selected the remaining five will collapse and the next 
level of concepts will display (Fig. 7b). This functionality will 
then continue for the lower levels (Fig. 7c-d). However, instead 
of collapsing the other symbols at lower levels, they will be 
hidden. This is to ensure complexity is still managed. Once 
collapsed the symbols become unidentifiable anyway, to hide 
them after the top level will ensure cognitive overload does not 
ensue.  
To further iterate the concept hierarchy on top of brightness, 
shape and size, we include another visual variable: vertical 
position. Once a symbol is selected, the sub-concepts display at 
a decreased size respectively to the lowest level (Fig. 7d). They 
also appear below the parent symbol giving the impression of a 
tree structure and that a lower vertical position indicates a lower 
concept level. However, when no symbol is selected the six key 
concepts are displayed vertically as well. To ensure the user 
does not infer a similar hierarchy, new links (lines) are used to 
connect parent and child concepts (Fig. 7c-d). Along with the 
fact that the core six concepts also have different colours and 
the same size (not reduced sizes like their children), we are 
confident this issue will not arise. Nevertheless, we also colour 
the links (lines) respective to their core area to reiterate this 
relationship. 
Along with vertical position we also use horizontal position. 
Unlike the majority of extensions (and modelling languages), 
our extension always places constructs in the exact same 
position relative to its associated IoT element explicitly. For 
example, if we were number each of the red symbols in Fig. 7d, 
one to six respectively. Symbol six (bottom right) will always 
appear in the same position irrelevant of whether or not symbols 
four and five are specified. This effectively means that if every 
icon was exactly the same, as they all have a unique position a 
user could still infer the construct from this alone. 
Of the eight visual variables our extension utilises seven of 
them, dismissing only texture. Thereby making our solution one 
of the first to explore and utilise the full toolset at a modelling 
languages disposal. 
C. Modelling Tool Functionality 
Given that our proposed solution will include 3D 
visualisation, navigation of the scene is a potentially 
problematic area [19]. Nevertheless, we propose using a similar 
method as that used in most 3D games and game engines. 
Wherein, the user can ‘fly’ a camera around the scene using 
WSAD keys and mouse input configuration [23]. However, this 
may not be all users’ preferences and some users will inevitably 
struggle to use this setup. Therefore, we will also include 
functionality to allow the user to align the camera to specific 
IoT and security elements with the push of a button.  
One requirement to be considered is coherence. Existing 
extensions at times have a difference of opinion on what a 
concept is and thereby how it should be used. To overcome this 
issue, extensions would benefit from explicitly specifying 
concept meanings and consequently their use. To implement 
this into our solution, we included a details toolbar. This will 
allow the user to access various information about symbols 
which would otherwise be difficult to represent through a 
notation; such as the definition of a concept.  
Where our ontology might be comprehensive to what a 
security notation should graphically represent, there is still 
room for more detail to be specified. For example, representing 
the security requirement for virtual private network in some 
cases may be adequate. However, there is more detail that could 
be specified such as L2TP or IKE [24]. Providing the 
functionality to specify such detail gives the modeller even 
more freedom to explicitly define their requirements. We 
represent such detail as text in a toolbar opposed to a graphical 
symbol to ensure graphic economy is maintained. When 
dropping to a level lower than the lowest of the ontology, the 
number of concepts hits an exponential increase. Take 
biometric as an example. If we were to include a graphical 
construct for each of biometric’s children concepts. The graphic 
complexity of the extension could increase by around five (iris, 
retina, facial, fingerprint and voice) just from this one concept. 
Therefore, it is more appropriate to specify very specific detail 
as text instead. 
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTATIONAL SOCIAL SYSTEMS 
 
6 
D. Choice of Technology 
When it comes to interactive digitally generated real-time 3D 
scenes projected onto 2D displays, game technology provides a 
range of technologies that support and simplify the 
development of interactive visualisation. Technical 
advancements in game technology include rendering, realistic 
physics, lighting, audio, graphical user interfaces (GUI), head-
up displays (HUD), inputs and scripting [25]. They are also able 
to serialize and deserialize XML files.  
The majority of engines available offer relatively similar 
functionality. The main differences being licensing costs and 
final render quality. If making a realistic first person shooter 
(FPS) for example, one of the best engines would be Unreal 4 
[26]. However, taking into consideration what we require from 
an engine, we chose to work with Unity2. This is mainly due to 
Unity’s functionality of being able to port to the majority of 
devices [27]. Although we have no immediate goal of 
developing on a platform beyond PC, this functionality is the 
most appealing to us in long term when compared to what other 
engines offered. Unity is also a free software to download. 
E. Application Framework 
We use two steps approach to create our BPMN diagram and 
include security. An overview of how the application works can 
be seen in Fig. 8. 
 
Fig. 8. Workflow Overview 
Although a crude overview, this figure provides a visual 
representation of: 
1. Creating a BPMN-based IoT diagram 
2. Saving an XML file of the diagram 
3. Reading the diagram into Unity 
4. Adding security requirements to the diagram in 
Unity. 
5. Saving an XML file of the security requirements. 
The BPMN-based XML file contains all the necessary data 
to redraw its respective IoT diagram within a game engine 
environment. Each IoT element is represented by a node within 
the file specifying the following details: element type, unique 
ID, height, width, x and y. From this data we can assign a 3D 
model to each element respective to its element type. Then using 
the width and height attributes rescale this model as required. 
The x and y coordinates however must be remapped within the 
game engine to the x and z axes respectively. Where x and y are 
commonly used for 2D, the third dimension (z) is used to add 
depth. Therefore to make the diagram more readable and save 
awkward rotation within the engine, the coordinates need 
remapping (Refer to Fig. 3 to better understand this). 
As previously mentioned, we plan to draw each security 
construct in the exact same location relative to its parent IoT 
 
2
 Unity Technologies, “Unity:Home” -  <https://unity3d.com/>, (accessed 
30/01/2018) 
element. This not only makes for a better notation, it also 
streamlines the development process. Referring back to Fig. 7, 
you will notice each IoT element has a grey line to show the 
linking of its security requirements; we call this a holder. As 
each construct will be in the same location respective to its IoT 
element. That means it will also be in the same location 
respective to this holder. As such, when adding security to each 
IoT element we are not required to store any coordinates. We 
simply need to specify what the associated IoT element is. From 
this, we can get the coordinates of that element and do a simple 
calculation to determine the holder location (we assume y is 
0/ground level), see Fig. 9: 
 
Fig. 9. Holder coordinates 
 � = �2 + ቀ�2 ቁ                                  (1) � = �2 + �  
Where…  x =  holder x coordinate  �2 =  IoT element x coordinate  w =  width of IoT element  z =  holder z coordinate  �2 =  IoT element z coordinate  …and o is an offset value from the top of the IoT 
element. 
 
Fig. 10. Modelling Tool User Interface Wireframe 
The Graphical User Interface (GUI) for our application will 
be split into three areas: build, settings and details. The build 
toolbar will consist of all the functionality required to add (and 
remove) security requirements to the IoT diagram. Settings as 
implied will control the various settings of the application, 
consisting of: hiding/showing of security requirements, 
focusing on a specific IoT element or security symbol and 
saving of the diagram itself. The details toolbar as previously 
discussed contains the various concept specifics (definitions 
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etc.). Each area will be contained as seen in Fig. 10. 
This reflects the conventional layout of modelling tools (see 
Section III) and should ensure a usable application through 
familiarity.  
V. DEVELOPMENT OF A 3D BPMN SECURITY EXTENSION 
The implementation of our application can be split into three 
phases: planning, asset production and development, see 
Fig.11. 
A. Planning 
The majority of the planning phase was covered earlier in the 
paper in Section II-IV. Specifically, defining what concepts we 
plan to include within our notation; those being the security 
requirements specified in our ontology [4].  
As for the scope of supported IoT element, BPMN has a 
graphic complexity of 171 constructs [22]. As we are only 
testing a proposed extension not building industry-ready 
software, considering time constraints, we will only include 
support for a small portion of the BPMN notation. This being: 
pool, lane, start event, end event, message start event, message 
catch event, timer start event, error end event, terminate end 
event, parallel gateway, exclusive gateway, inclusive gateway, 
user task, business rule task, script task, receive task, and 
service task. Nevertheless, we are confident we have included 
sufficient notation for the coverage of most general SIoT 
scenarios. 
 
Fig. 11. Application development phases 
B. Asset Production 
When using an object (security construct) more than once in 
a game engine it is a good practice to assign that object a prefab. 
This allows all instances of the object to be edited at the same 
time and for the object to be easily instantiated from code [27]. 
To develop a prefab of a security notation requires just two 
components: a 3D plane and a diffuse texture. We apply the 
diffuse texture to the plane. Then, so long as the background of 
our diffuse texture is alpha, we can toggle the setting within 
Unity to read all alpha channels as transparency. This game 
object can then be set to act as a prefab for the respective 
construct, as seen in Fig. 12. 
 
Fig. 12. Creation of construct prefab 
The same process is also used to create the prefabs of 
supported IoT elements. 
C. Development 
The first stage of the development process was to render the 
IoT diagram. As each IoT element now has a designated prefab 
we could use the method described previously to redraw the 
diagram. Fig. 13 shows a screenshot of a rendered IoT diagram 
within the game engine environment. 
 
Fig. 13. IoT diagram rendered within game engine 
The next stage involved parallel development of both: 
visualising security notation and functionality to add security 
notation to each IoT element. Within the application, security 
constructs are specified by: 
1. Highlighting a IoT element (clicking on it).  
2. Adding a holder to the element (button press). 
3. Choosing a respective security construct (button 
press). 
When a user assigns a security construct, rather than 
manually placing it like in other languages, the application 
performs some calculations and places the construct in a 
specific position relative to the IoT element and holder. 
 In the previous section we discussed how holders calculate 
their coordinates based on the associated IoT element. Each 
security construct has a similar relationship to its holder. From 
the holder coordinates, a security construct can use an equation 
respective to its position to calculate its own coordinates. For 
example, access control which is always at the top of the holder 
is calculated by first assigning the same coordinates as the 
holder. Then translating the construct 400 units along the y axis 
and slightly offsetting the x coordinates to account for the 
symbol width, see Fig. 14. Similar equations are predefined 
within the application for every construct. 
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Fig. 14. Security construct coordinates 
As for the modularisation of security constructs. This was 
accomplished by assigning each construct its own family tree. 
Should access control be selected, any construct whose parent 
is access control will then display. Similarly, if a child construct 
is highlighted, along with its own children displaying any 
siblings will collapse or hide depending on their level. 
The details toolbar is another core functionality within our 
application. As stated early, coherence is an issue most 
extensions suffer from. Therefore, to overcome this issue, we 
included a toolbar that shows the definition of the currently 
highlighted concept, see Fig. 15. 
 
Fig. 15. Details toolbar - Credentials 
Along with the concept definition, you will also notice in Fig. 
15, the inclusion of lower level security detail. In this instance: 
username required, password required, pin required, and 
password change period (weeks). As with the other security 
requirements in our extension, not all users will need or use 
such detail. Nevertheless, providing the functionality to specify 
this detail ensures an overall more comprehensive extension. 
VI. EXAMPLE WALKTHROUGH 
In order to explain how the application actually works. this 
section covers a more comprehensive walkthrough of adding 
security notation to an IoT diagram. 
First of all, as a modeller you must decide on which IoT 
element you wish to add security to (all supported notations can 
specify security). Then using the left mouse button select the 
element as seen in Fig. 16. 
 
Fig. 16. Highlighting an IoT element 
The application notifies the user that the IoT element is 
highlighted by placing an open-rectangle highlighter around it. 
It is also coloured red to further iterate this. 
The next step is to add a holder to the element. This is 
accomplished by pressing the respective button in the build 
toolbar, as seen in Fig. 17. 
 
Fig. 17. Holder button location 
Once an IoT element has a holder the application will give 
the user access to the six key concept as identified in paper [4] 
(Until a holder is added, this functionality is disabled.) The user 
then simply needs to add their choice of construct by pressing 
the respective button. These buttons are located under the build 
menu and can be seen to the left of the screen in Fig. 17. 
However, this only works for the key six concepts. If the user 
wishes to add a concept of a lower level they must first select 
the parent construct by pressing it with the left mouse button. 
This will then change the set of constructs in the build menu to 
the children of the highlighted construct. Taking access control 
as an example parent. If we highlight this construct, the security 
requirements in the build menu will change from the core six to 
authentication, identification, and authorisation. This is 
another way of managing the complexity of the application 
along with the usability and speed at which a modeller can 
specify their requirements. When familiar with the notation 
hierarchy a modeller will be able to quickly add their 
requirements by selecting parent and child constructs. 
Compared with traditional methods of long scrollable lists of 
constructs our approach is much more manageable.  
When selecting a parent symbol, the other symbols on the 
same level are either collapsed or hidden. An example of this 
can be seen in Fig. 18. 
 
Fig. 18. Symbol hiding and collapsing 
In this example, the highlighted concept is authentication, 
located inside Fig. 18b’s red box. As the parent must also be 
highlighted (access control) the remaining concepts in the key 
six will collapse (Fig. 18a) (Refer to the element in the right 
side of the figure for an example of the key six not collapsed). 
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We will also be able to see by viewing Fig. 18b, how level two 
and lower concepts in the hierarchy hide their siblings when 
highlighted opposed to collapsing them. Authentication is 
siblings with identification and authorisation. However, as 
authentication has been highlighted in this instance, 
identification and authorisation are hidden from view. This is 
done as a way of managing the complexity of a diagram and 
reducing the visual clutter when trying to view a specific 
concept and its children. 
As mentioned earlier, when a modeller is familiar with the 
notation hierarchy they will be able to work more efficiently 
when adding security requirements. However, it is unrealistic 
on our part to assume all users can only take advantage when 
familiar with the notation. Therefore, we included a button 
within the application which shows the ontology [4] when 
pressed. This way, users don’t have to refer to external sources 
should they need reminding of a certain hierarchy or where a 
construct is located. The ontology within the application can be 
seen in Fig. 19.  
 
Fig. 19. Security ontology within application 
For most constructs, specifying a link to an IoT element 
through parent/child links and holders is sufficient. However, 
there are some security concepts (e.g. separation of duty and 
binding of duty) which require linking to multiple IoT elements.  
Within our application we included this functionality through 
the use of modularisation and the details toolbar. The 
modularisation side was already implemented as discussed 
earlier in this section. The details toolbar contains the 
functionality to specify any other IoT elements the constructs 
require linking to. This was done by using a form-style 
dropdown menu. The menu takes each text/name value of every 
IoT element within the diagram then lists them for the user to 
choose from (assuming they haven’t already been linked; these 
elements are removed). This system can be seen in Fig. 20. 
 
Fig. 20. Binding of duty IoT element linking 
Once a user links another IoT element, the link is visually 
represented by a line across the diagram. The only way a user 
can access this functionality however is if the constructs 
themselves are visible on screen. When the hierarchy is 
collapsed and binding of duty is hidden, the links are no longer 
visible. An example of how this looks within the application be 
seen in Fig. 21. 
 
 
Fig. 21. Binding of duty diagram element linking 
VII. EVALUATION OF THE 3D SECURITY EXTENSION 
We evaluate our extension against the “Physics of Notations” 
identified by Moody [5]. It defines nine principles used for 
evaluating any notations to ensure a scientific approach is kept 
in their assessment. These are design principles of notation not 
just for cyber security, but also for any notations used in real 
world such as traffic signs etc. They are frequently used in the 
evaluation of modelling languages as well including that of 
BPMN [22, 28].  
 
A. Semiotic Clarity 
Firstly, the semiotic clarity of the notation. Although some 
extensions appear comprehensive to the cyber security domain, 
this is only relative to the construct deficit many of the others 
suffer from. In fairness to several extensions, they do explicitly 
specify their focus on a particular area of security and as such 
their paucity can be excused. Nevertheless, needing multiple 
extensions to specify requirements for the same domain is very 
poor usability and will likely lead to the extensions being 
dismissed altogether. In our solution, semiotic clarity was 
guaranteed by ensuring every concept within our ontology has 
a respective construct within the notation. 
B. Perceptual Discriminabiltiy 
IoT and security notation are distinguishable instantly by the 
fact they are on different axes to each other. IoT is across the x 
and z axes, where security is across the x, y and z axes. All 
security notation is also encompassed by a shield shape. 
Whereas no IoT element uses this shape. 
As for the security notation itself there are multiple factors 
that we have utilised to ensure perceptual discriminability. 
Every construct is in a unique position. Each of the six key areas 
have a unique colour and brightness dependent on hierarchy. 
All of the constructs have a unique icon -and finally- dual 
coding was used to label every construct in case all other 
variables fail. 
C. Semantic Transparency 
As for semantic transparency, we feel our notation falls 
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somewhere between transparent and translucent. Some 
concepts such as firewall, are very easily represented in a 
graphical form. Others such as public key infrastructure prove 
a lot more difficult. Nevertheless, we have created each icon 
with the intent of them being a mnemonic to their underlying 
semantics. As such, where a construct may not be semantically 
immediate. We believe with some definition and reasoning to 
how the icon was constructed, the user will be able to make the 
connection themselves in very little time. 
Of course, each construct is also labelled, so after a few uses 
of the extension learnability alone will ensure semantic 
transparency. 
D. Complexity Management 
Given that complexity management was one of the core 
motivation for this project, we are certain our application meets 
this requirement. 
To manage complexity we have split both notations (IoT and 
security) onto separate planes whilst still ensuring a relationship 
is maintained. We have also used modularisation to seamlessly 
tier security hierarchies and stop cognitive overload from 
occurring. This functionality was also incorporated into the 
modelling tool itself, whereby the application will only display 
functionality to add children of the currently highlighted 
construct. The modularisation also collapses and hides 
constructs from view that are not within the current hierarchy. 
Given that our approach of modelling security has allowed 
for the inclusion of around 80 new constructs to IoT notations 
without cognitive overload, it proves how well our tool 
manages complexity. 
E. Cognitive Intergration 
Cognitive integration is a difficult principle to meet and in 
many ways requires a project such as this with a sole aim of 
solving it. In this instance this is not something we addressed. 
As it is not incorporated into IoT itself it is not something we 
prioritised to solve within this project. 
F. Visual Expressiveness 
As mentioned earlier in the paper, visual expressiveness was 
done very successfully within our notation. Horizontal and 
vertical position were used to show both hierarchy within the 
notation as well as to provide each construct a unique and 
identifiable location. Brightness and size (although size was 
discreetly used) were then utilised to further iterate this 
hierarchy.  
Colour was used as a way of distinguishing between each of 
the six key areas as defined in our ontology. Shape was utilised 
for the both the holder shape (shield), and the unique icon of 
each construct. Orientation most importantly was used a way 
of distinguishing IoT and security notation. The only variable 
this application did not utilise was texture. By hitting seven of 
the possible eight visual variables however, we are confident in 
stating our notation as being visually expressive. 
G. Dual Coding 
Dual coding, a relatively straightforward principle to achieve 
can be seen by viewing any of our previous figures which 
include a notation construct. Within each shield we placed the 
name of the concept across the top. 
H. Graphic Economy 
Linking into complexity management, graphic economy 
ensures notations do not reach exceedingly high numbers of 
constructs. Along with issues such as construct redundancy, 
having a poor graphic economy can be overwhelming to a user, 
especially a novice [5]. 
Given the method in which we allow access to our constructs 
we believe that our notation has a good economy. If we had 
listed all of our constructs in a dropdown menu as most other 
tools do, our economy could be considered poor. Nevertheless, 
given that users are only ever subject to around six concepts or 
less at any given time, we are confident in stating this principle 
has been met. 
I. Cognitive Fit 
Cognitive fit is a principle we achieved by modularisation of 
the security hierarchy. By showing six concepts at the highest 
level acts as a mechanism for novice users to utilise the 
notation. As expertise and domain knowledge increases users 
can then select one of these six and specify more specific 
concepts. Therefore, we consider the application to have four 
levels of cognitive fit, respective to the four tiers of each 
security hierarchy. 
In summary, of Moody’s nine principles, our extension 
satisfies eight of them. Although some still have room for 
improvement, given that we created our notation very much 
with these principles in mind ensured we were able to satisfy 
most of them. 
J. Experiments and Results 
As previously mentioned, we carried out experiments to 
evaluate our 3D platform against conventional 2D solutions in 
paper [20]. Participants were asked to implement the same tasks 
within the same time period in 2D and 3D environments 
respectively. Their completion rate and accuracy were 
measured in comparison. 
 
Fig. 22. 2D v 3D accuracy comparison 
Fig. 22. illustrates the performance difference between the 
2D and 3D approaches. With the exceptions of Participant 12 
who achieved 100% accuracy in every experiment, and 
Participant 11 who performed better on the 2D solution. Every 
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other participant achieved a higher accuracy percentage when 
using 3D solution. Put into numbers, on average, participants 
improved their accuracy by 169.1% ±69.33% when working in 
3D environment compared to working in 2D, although the 
margin of error is quite large in this instance. Even if we view 
the accuracy from a worst-case perspective in regards to this, 
the average participant still made a 100% accuracy 
improvement. The same can be said for the completion 
percentage, though not as substantially different, participants 
completed 21.05% ±8.18% more of the 3D diagram tasks 
compared with the 2D diagram, as shown in Fig. 23. 
 
Fig. 23. 2D v 3D completion comparison 
VIII. RELATED WORK 
There are some existing security extensions created for 
BPMN. We evaluate them by using the same principles defined 
by Moody. 
The security notation shown in Fig. 24 is the extension 
created by Rodriguez et al. [12]. The symbols from left-to-right 
represent: non-repudiation, attack harm detection, integrity, 
privacy, and access control. Perceptual discriminability has 
both strengths and weaknesses in this extension. The symbols 
are very distinct from the BPMN notation; separating their 
domain well from business processes. However, they are far too 
similar to each other, with only a few textual characters being 
the difference. Given that the distinguishing factor is text -
making international use extremely difficult- this extension 
fails to adequately meet this principle. 
 
Fig. 24. Rodriguez et al. security notation 
The semantic transparency of the symbols is of a similar 
nature. A padlock successfully infers the meaning of security, 
but as all the concepts are represented by a padlock, without the 
use of text any further detail is impossible to distinguish; failing 
this principle. This leads onto the visual expressiveness of the 
symbols. There are eight visual variables which can be used to 
construct a notation, these being: horizontal position, vertical 
position, shape, brightness, size, orientation, colour , and 
texture [5]. This extension is only utilising one of the eight; that 
being shape. Very little potential has been taken advantage of 
graphically. 
The complexity management of this extension is non-
existent having adopted the method of stamping symbols onto 
BPMN elements. Where this may be an effective way of linking 
BPMN tasks and security concepts, diagrams quickly become 
overwhelmed when multiple concepts are placed on a single 
element. In the paper that introduces it [12], the symbols are 
displayed on a BPMN diagram at their target size; when scaled, 
the text on each notation is very difficult to read. Given that text 
has been used as primary notation, it is extremely poor design 
given that once the symbols are displayed at a usable size the 
text becomes nearly unreadable. Ideally text should only ever 
be used as a secondary notation to reiterate a semantic meaning. 
It has very poor cognitive effectiveness and provides very little 
discriminability between symbols [5]. However, as it has very 
much been used as a core distinguishing variable in this case, it 
is by far the biggest weakness of the design. Further 
appreciation of this fault can be found when viewing the 
notation from a non-English speaking perspective. 
The dual coding principle states that text, more specifically 
words, should be used to complement graphics [5]. Used 
correctly text can be a useful tool for learning a notation. A 
novice user for example can keep referring to construct labels 
until they are confident enough using just visual aids. However, 
using acronyms adds to the difficulty of this as now novices 
must not only learn graphical symbols but these as well. In this 
instance, dual coding has not been satisfied. 
The graphic economy of this notation is fairly successful. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, there are concept omissions 
within the extension. A notation with poor graphic economy is 
more desirable than one with construct deficit. As for cognitive 
integration and cognitive fit, the paper made no mention of any 
functionality to support either of these principles. 
Saleem et al. [13], slightly newer, security extension takes a 
different approach notation-wise, but still yields several issues. 
In Fig. 25 from left-to-right, the symbols represent 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability respectfully; the core 
concepts of cyber security [29]. 
 
Fig. 25. Saleem et al. security notation 
In this case, the perceptual discriminability of the symbols 
was done rather successfully. Although similar in theme, each 
notation has several distinguishing variables that don't include 
text. This makes the unique identification from any culture or 
language very easy. The same can be said about the semantic 
transparency. This extension has at least had some thought put 
into semiotics, creating a notation whose symbols perceptually 
resemble their semantic meaning. However, there are still some 
areas that allow for improvement. Take integrity for example; 
colour has been used as a primary notation to show an identical 
pattern both before and after a transmission; an appropriate 
visualisation. A better option however, would be to use shapes 
such as triangles and squares. Colour is very useful in notations, 
but like text should be a secondary notation not a primary 
notation [5]. Some people can struggle to distinguish between 
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certain colours, with the likes of blue and green being a prime 
example for people who suffer from Tritanopia [30] a variant 
of colour blindness. 
The visual expressiveness of these symbols appears much 
higher than that of Rodriguez et al. with around three variables 
being used this time (colour, texture, and shape). However, 
visual expressiveness refers to the idea that multiple variables 
should be used as a form of secondary notation. The only 
variable distinguishing these symbols is shape; colour and 
texture are merely decoration. To better utilise colour for 
example, each symbol should have had its own unique one e.g. 
red, blue and green. 
Complexity management is the same as with the previous 
extension (given the impact of this principle to visual notations 
it is a wonder so few acknowledge it). The paper that introduces 
this extension also provides a complete BPMN diagram 
incorporating the symbols. The notations again have very poor 
scalability; but not as bad as that of Rodriguez et al. as there is 
a much higher perceptual discriminability in these symbols. 
Nonetheless, these symbols are not enclosed in a uniform shape 
as with the previous extension, when close together their 
boundaries become hard to see and they begin to corrupt each 
other. 
As seen in Fig. 25 the principle of dual coding has not been 
met. The graphic economy is similar to that of the previous 
extension. Although it may be economical, the reason of it 
being construct deficit is a worse anomaly. As for cognitive fit 
and cognitive integration, they were also neglected by Saleem 
et al. 
Salnitri et al. SecBPMN2 [11] notation can be seen in Fig. 
26. From left-to-right the concepts are as follows: integrity, 
authenticity, accountability, non-repudiation, auditability, 
confidentiality, privacy, binding of duties, separation of duties, 
availability, and non-delegation. 
 
Fig. 26. SecBPMN2 security notation 
The perceptual discriminability of these symbols is 
somewhat successful, but the visual distance between each 
symbol is dependent exclusively on shape. Nevertheless, as 
each symbol is clearly distinguishable from the others, the 
extension satisfies the principle. As for semantic transparency, 
these symbols fall somewhere in the semantically translucent 
range. They are not capable of semantic immediacy but nor are 
they are opaque. There has been some thought put into their 
design but there are still uncertainties as to their exact meaning; 
a weak satisfaction of the principle. The visual expressiveness 
of the symbols as touched on earlier is limited again; the only 
variable in use is shape. Some may argue colour has also been 
used, as mentioned earlier though this must be in the form of 
secondary notation. Nevertheless, given that orange has been 
used consistently throughout all the symbols, separates this 
notation well from BPMN (which tends to be black and white 
or pale pastel colours). 
The complexity management of this extension is rather poor. 
Viewing it in use in Fig. 27, it is easy to see how some users 
may feel in a state of cognitive overload. This is partially due 
to the dashed lines across the diagram, however given that very 
few concepts have been used, it is easy to see how this extension 
can quickly overwhelm a diagram. 
 
 
Fig. 27. SecBPMN2 business process model 
The remaining principles follow a similar theme as the 
previous extensions. Graphic economy is achieved through a 
construct deficit language, dual coding is not included and 
cognitive fit and cognitive integration are altogether ignored. 
Labda et al. security notation [31] can be seen in Fig. 28. The 
symbols from left-to-right represent: access control (allow), 
access control (prevent), access control (limited), separation of 
tasks, binding of tasks, user consent, necessity to know (high), 
necessity to know (medium), and necessity to know (low). 
 
Fig. 28. Labda et al. security notation 
The perceptual discriminability of this extension is difficult 
to determine. Each symbol is undoubtedly unique from the 
others but the three necessity to know constructs have little 
visual distance. There appears to have been an attempt at 
adhering to the principle of semantic transparency. 
Nevertheless, the symbols are borderline between semantically 
opaque and perverse. For example, the concept of separation of 
tasks is represented by a lightning bolt; a strange choice of 
mnemonic. Given that these symbols don’t exactly infer their 
semantic meaning it is difficult to conclude semantic 
transparency has been met.  
The visual expressiveness of the symbols is similar to the 
previous extensions. The only utilised variable is shape with 
colour once again acting as a weak secondary notation to 
separate the security notation from BPMN. 
The complexity management of this extension is the same as 
Rodriguez et al. [12]; also using the symbol stamping method. 
As expected similar themes emerge. To place the concepts on 
BPMN elements they require scaling which once again makes 
perceptually discriminability difficult, especially given there's 
a visual distance of just one (shape). The graphic economy of 
this extension is controlled but this again is dependent on 
whether or not semiotic clarity was satisfied in the first instance. 
Cognitive fit and cognitive integration again are not 
acknowledged within this extension with dual coding clearly 
not included by observation of Fig. 28. 
One of our previous notation [9] (see Fig. 29) is similar to 
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that of Salnitri et al but particularly with aim of IoT devices. 
Both opting for a circular shape with some form of icon inside. 
The underlying semantics for this notation are security task, 
authentication, access control, authorisation, harm protection, 
encrypted message, non-repudiation,  and secure 
communication respectively left-to-right. The final three 
symbols represent confidentiality, integrity, and availability. 
With the stars visualising the required level for each as 
discussed in the previous section. 
 
Fig. 29 Koh and Zhou security notation 
Starting again with the perceptual discriminability of the 
notation, this extension has both positives and negatives. We 
used a padlock on each symbol as a way of identifying and 
separating them as security constructs. This is an effective way 
of separating the notation from BPMN. However, given that the 
general design is very similar to that of BPMN (black and white 
icons in circles) the notation isn’t as semantically immediate as 
it could be. Nevertheless, the use of padlocks and the icons 
inside each shape ensures the satisfaction of this principle 
(although there is room for improvement). 
The semantic transparency of these symbols is similar to 
Labda et al. notation. It is clear from inspection of each element 
that thought has gone into making each symbol. However, some 
of the symbols are semantically perverse. Take access control 
for example (third symbol along on the top row). This icon is 
the universal symbol for “shuffle mode” on audio devices. 
Although expert security users may have a different meaning, 
the majority of business and novice users will be more likely to 
associate this icon with “shuffle”. A less generic icon should 
have been used. 
The complexity management of this extension is a 
combination of symbol stamping and BPMN element 
replacement. By this we mean, rather than use a BPMN 
message event, one would use a security element encrypted 
message. However, we realised that this was a poor way to 
model security. Although business and security directly affect 
each other, readers do not always want or need to see both 
domains. Extensions should aim to be as non-intrusive as 
possible, allowing modellers the ability to remove (or hide) 
security requirements whilst still maintaining a complete 
business process (Effectively a complexity management system 
on its own). A portion of a BPMN diagram can be seen in Fig. 
30 demonstrating this extension in use.  
This figure emphasises our previous point on how the 
notation is far too similar to BPMN. It is not as clear in this 
figure as in SecBPMN2 what is security and what is business 
process. On further inspection it will be able to identify eight 
security elements in use. Nevertheless, there has been no 
attempt at managing the extra complexity created by the 
extension. Once again failing this principle. 
 
 
Fig. 30 Koh and Zhou business process model 
The visual expressiveness of this extension is rather poor, 
utilising only one variable: shape. Confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability could be considered to use horizontal and 
vertical position also as they seem to consistently appear in the 
top left of each diagram in the authors’ paper. However, it is not 
explicitly defined whether this is a rule of the notation.  
Dual coding is also neglected within this extension. None of 
the elements feature any supporting text, with confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability once again using letters as 
discriminable features. The graphic economy carries on from 
the previous section, although the number of elements is 
manageable being construct deficit is worse. As for cognitive 
fit and cognitive integration these were also left out of this 
extension. For all the drawbacks we identified I use, it 
motivated us to look at the issue from the perspective of third 
dimension. 
From this review, of the five extensions evaluated not one 
extension is capable of satisfying even half of Moody’s 
principles. Moody discussed how there are trade-offs amongst 
the principles and satisfying one may have a negative effect on 
another. Nevertheless, certain principles such as complexity 
management should always be achieved, especially in software 
engineering [5]. In contrast, our security extension proposed in 
this paper is not only comprehensive to the domain but can also 
satisfies the most optimal number of principles. 
 
IX. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Security is one of the key problems needs to be addressed 
before the wide application of IoT devices. The deep 
engagement of smart devices into our daily lives means a Social 
IoT environment comprises interactions between both humans 
and the things. While benefiting from the convenience it 
brought to us, the security issue could have even bigger impact 
and more severe consequences on our society [32, 33]. 
Understanding the security issue requires us to first capture and 
model the security requirements in such dynamic environment.     
In this paper, we explored the possibility to use BPMN to 
represent SIoT scenarios. The nature of business process, which 
contains both automatic service task and manual user task 
means BPMN is capable of capturing both the technical and 
social aspects of SIoT environment. Based on this, we proposed 
to use the third dimension to model the security requirements. 
Unlike traditional 2D based solutions, which suffer from the 
complexity management issue, our solution separate the 
security notations from the IoT diagram in different dimension 
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thus makes it much easier to manage for even non-security 
experts. We designed the new 3D security extensions by 
following the design principles outlined by Moody for 
notations. It is comprehensive (supported by our ontology) and 
proving to be capable of satisfying the most number of these 
principles.   
A complete framework for our notation (both symbolic and 
visual representation) was detailed with explicit note on how 
we achieve complexity management (amongst other 
principles). We then discussed how we implemented our 
proposed notation within a game engine focusing specifically 
on the functionality we created to ensure complexity 
management and usability.  
As these principles are only a theoretical evaluation, in our 
future works we plan to test the application with real users. This 
way we can assess the application from a usability perspective 
as well as gauging the potential adoption of the application 
within an industry SIoT environment. 
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